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INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, the Indo-Pacific region was
only another region for proxy wars between the two
blocs. However in the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific
region has gained a geopolitical significance due its
important role in maintaining global energy security.
The Indo-Pacific hosts vital sea lanes of communica-
tion (SLOCs) that are vital global economic lifelines
for the advanced economies of the world, including
the rising China and also the United States. Most of
international seaborne cargo passing through the
SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific is valuable energy resources
— oil, gas, and coal — from the Gulf petro-economies
to the advanced and emerging Asian economies. In
2012, seaborne trade reached 9.2 billion tons world-
wide and Asia saw the largest amount, surpassing the
Americas significantly (United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, 2013). Maintaining the
security of SLOCs have become an essential concern
for great powers, such as China and India, and also
emerging powers, i.e. littoral states, alike. As such, the
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Abstrak:
Artikel ini bermaksud untuk mengelaborasikan pentingnya Poros Maritim Dunia yang diterapkan oleh Indonesia dan posisi strategis kawasan Indo-
Pasifik dalam hubungan internasional saat ini. Indo-Pasifik muncul menjadi salah satu teater yang signifikan dalam jalur perhubungan laut dunia atau
Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). Sebagai negara pantai yang ekonominya sedang berkembang, Indonesia sangat tergantung kepada SLOCs
di Indo-Pasifik. Terlebih, Indonesia juga membutuhkan suplai yang stabil dalam sumber daya minyak dan gas dari negara teluk yang melewati Indo-
Pasifik. Gangguan yang terjadi pada sumber daya tersebut akan mengakibatkan ancaman pada keamanan energi di Indonesia, yang berimbas pada
ancaman keamanan. Indonesia selama ini telah aktif dalam menjaga keamanan di salah satu SLOC yang vital yaitu Selat Malaka. Artikel ini juga
mengelaborasikan Poros Maritim Dunia yang diwacanakan oleh Presiden Jokowi guna menjaga keamanan seluruh Indo-Pasifik, tidak hanya di Asia
Tenggara.
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Abstract:
This article tries to elaborate the strategic position of Indo-Pacific in the current international relations. This region has become a new crucial theatre
for the global sea lanes of communication. As a littoral country in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia relies heavily on the SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia,
as a developing economy, requires a steady supply in oil and gas from the Gulf. A sudden disturbance in oil resources would have a catastrophic effect
on energy security in Indonesia, which could lead to other security implications. Indonesia has mostly been active in safeguarding the Malacca Strait,
one vital SLOC in the Indo-Pacific. This article also elaborates President Jokowi’s maritime axis as a guarantor of maritime security not only in Southeast
Asia, but the entire Indo-Pacific.
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Indo-Pacific region has become an unpredictable and
complex environment full of intersecting and overlap-
ping interests from many countries.
As a littoral country in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia
relies heavily on the SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia, as a developing economy, requires a steady
supply in oil and gas from the Gulf. Statistics from the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) in
Indonesia show that in 2012, oil consumption
reached 595 million barrels of oil equivalent (Mboe),
whereas natural gas consumption reached 255 Mboe
(Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral,
2013a). The ESDM predicts Indonesia’s total energy
consumption will increase by 5.5% per year until
2035, with oil and gas making up more than 50% of
the energy mix (Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya
Mineral, 2013b). A sudden disturbance in oil re-
sources would have a catastrophic effect on energy
security in Indonesia, which could lead to other
security implications. Indonesia has mostly been active
in safeguarding the Malacca Strait, one vital SLOC in
the Indo-Pacific. Efforts to secure the Malacca Strait
began in 2004, with the establishment of the trilateral
MALSINDO (Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia) joint
patrols. In 2005, the Eyes in the Sky (EIS) program
were launched as part of the Malacca Strait Security
Initiative (MSSI). The program was also a trilateral
effort by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to curb
maritime security threats in the Malacca Strait (Vavro,
2008). To further increase Indonesia’s security role in
the Malacca, incumbent Joko Widodo proposed his
maritime axis doctrine, which seeks to expand
Indonesia’s role as a guarantor of maritime security
not only in Southeast Asia, but the entire Indo-Pacific.
This paper reviews the maritime security challenges
in the SLOCs of the Indo-Pacific. Then, we attempt to
place Joko Widodo’s maritime axis in the context of
addressing these challenges. Joko Widodo’s global
maritime axis attempts to expand Indonesia’s mari-
time influence from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian
Ocean. To meet that end, Indonesia has commenced
domestic, bilateral, and multilateral efforts.
ANALYSIS
MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific can be broken down
into five distinct regions, each with their respective
and distinct challenges: the Indian Ocean, the Malacca
Strait, the Taiwan Strait, the East and South China
Seas, and the Sea of Japan. The map below shows the
importance of this SLOCs.
Map of SLOCs in Indo-Pacific. Center for Security Studies. 2013. Strategic Trends 2013. ETH Zurich.
http://www.css.ethz.ch/
THE INDIAN OCEAN
Mostly overlooked for the entire 20th century, the
Indian Ocean, or sometimes named the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR), has garnered significant attention from
the world’s great and emerging powers due to its
geopolitical importance. It is the first waterway
transports have to pass through to reach the Asian
energy markets and is also home to the Gulf petro-
economies that house over 50 percent of the global oil
and natural gas reserves, making the Ocean an impor-
tant waterway in the global energy supply chain. In the
past, the IOR was mostly supervised by the United
States as the main waterway for entering the Gulf.
However, as U.S. influence declined, India and China
are both competing for influence in the region. With
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China seeking to expand its “string of pearls” into the
Indian Ocean, an emerging India seeking a larger role
in regional security, and a number of weak and failed
states along the rim, the Indian Ocean has become an
unpredictable and volatile ocean rife with great power
politics and non-traditional security issues.
Piracy and armed robbery remains a security
concern in the region, especially in the waters off the
coast of Somalia. Pirates usually target merchant ships
with precious cargo, or hold passenger ships for
ransom. In 2008, the UN issued Resolution 1851 as a
response to the frequent incidents of piracy and armed
robbery. The Resolution called for states to cooperate
in counter-piracy measures using naval force in Somali
waters. Counter-piracy efforts have continued ever
since, with 28 states and 3 dedicated coalition forces
actively fighting against piracy. As a result, piracy levels
have dropped. Statistics from the International
Maritime Bureau shows a significant decline in at-
tempted and actual pirate attacks in Somalia, with
only 3 attacks occurring in 2014 as opposed to 139
attacks in 2010 (International Maritime Bureau,
2015).
Illicit trade is also a security concern in the region.
Weak and failed states along the Indian Ocean rim are
good spots to smuggle contraband — from narcotics to
black market weapons — and also humans to the larger
black markets in the West.
Aside from non-traditional security, the Ocean is
also prone to conflicts between great powers. The
Hormuz Strait is one of the most important water-
ways in the Indian Ocean, as 40 percent of the world’s
oil passes through the Strait. Unilateral closure of the
Hormuz Strait, possibly due to U.S.-Iran tensions,
would substantially disrupt the global oil supply and
have chaotic consequences on the world economy.
Additionally, potential security challenges come from
China-India rivalry in the Ocean. Experts, such as
Frankel (2011) and Michel and Sticklor (2012), predict
that the Indian Ocean will become the next battle-
ground between China and India. China is advancing
with their “string of pearls”, a series of port facilities in
the Indian Ocean which China would use as foot-
holds to maintain their sphere of influence; whereas
India is liberally increasing its defense expenditure to
modernize its armed forces and pushing forward
Modi’s “Act East” policy to bolster ties with countries
in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean is also possible
of becoming a nuclear ocean. In 2008, the United
States and India signed a nuclear deal and has since
conducted multiple arms deals and joint military
exercises.
The Indian Ocean has only recently emerged in
Indonesian foreign policy dialogue due to Joko
Widodo’s vision for a global maritime axis. Indonesia
seeks to revive its old geopolitical view of “between
two continents, between two oceans”; a view that was
once held by Mohammad Hatta (1953). As such,
Indonesia’s interests in the Indian Ocean are mainly
economic and are based on multilateralism. Indonesia
shares 1,300 kilometres of maritime boundaries with
India, Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand; and 1.5
million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) territory in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean
(Shekar & Liow, 2014). Thus, it would be in
Indonesia’s interest to safeguard its EEZ territory for
economic gain. Indonesia would have to be part of a
multilateral platform if it were to have an influence on
the issues in the Indian Ocean. Towards that end,
Indonesia would have to be involved in the Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to engage with India.
Additionally, to engage China and their ‘string of
pearls’, Indonesia would have to address unresolved
issues in their bilateral relations.
THE MALACCA STRAIT
The second region is the Malacca Strait, where oil
from the Gulf has to pass through before reaching the
advanced economies of East Asia and the growing
economies of Southeast Asia. More than 60,000
vessels, counting up for almost a quarter of global
trade, passes through the Malacca Strait, making it a
vital SLOC. As the busiest SLOC in the region and a
natural naval chokepoint, the Malacca Strait needs to
be consistently monitored from non-traditional
security threats, mostly maritime piracy and
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transnational crime.
Narrow waters and numerous islets provide safe
havens for pirates to operate in the waters of the
Malacca Strait. In 2004, piracy in the Malacca Strait
accounted for 40 percent of maritime piracy world-
wide. To address the issue, a trilateral initiative was
launched by Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia
known as the Malacca Strait Coordinated Patrols
(MALSINDO). The Indian Coast Guard joined in the
coordinated patrols in 2006. As a result, piracy in the
Malacca Strait declined and was eventually eradicated
in 2008 (Raymond, 2009). However, pirates have once
again shown up in the Strait. In 2014, there were a
total 141 pirate attacks in Southeast Asia, with most
occurring in the Malacca and Singapore Straits (Inter-
national Maritime Bureau, 2015). Considering the
Strait’s importance in the global oil supply chain,
ASEAN has been called upon to address the issue of
piracy, but ASEAN has yet to set up a comprehensive
maritime security measure that involves all ASEAN
members.
Smuggling is a common occurrence in the Malacca
Strait, given the presence of busy ports and high
traffic. Common items smuggled through the Strait
include crude oil, weapons, human organs, and drugs.
The estimated value of black markets in Indonesia,
Singapore, and Malaysia is around USD 20 billion.
Aside from contraband, over 250,000 women and
70,000 children are illegally trafficked annually
through the Malacca Strait. Human trafficking is often
difficult to detect as smugglers use phantom ships to
conceal human cargo (Umaña, 2013).
Illegal fishing also poses a problem in the Malacca
Strait and surrounding waters, especially for Indone-
sia. As the largest littoral state in Southeast Asia,
illegal fishing has cost the country staggering economic
losses and potential environmental damage. According
to Susi Pudijiastuti, the Minister of Marine Affairs and
Fisheries, illegal fishing costs the economy Rp300
trillion annually (Ministry of Marine Affairs and
Fisheries, 2015). From an ecological standpoint, illegal
fishers disregard environmental regulations that are
meant to sustain the marine ecosystem by fishing in
protected areas, causing an imbalance in the ecosys-
tem. Furthermore, illegal fishers often employ destruc-
tive methods, such as blast fishing, which causes
significant ecological damage (Weatherby, 2015). So
far, Indonesia has been unable to effectively address
illegal fishing due to an underequipped Navy and lack
of cooperation with other ASEAN members.
SLOC security has remained mostly the burden of
the three littoral countries, despite the importance of
the Malacca Strait; however, the burden sharing has
not been proportional to ensure effective SLOC
security. Singapore depends heavily on safe passage of
trade vessels through the Malacca Strait, causing
Singapore to invest more in maritime security; while
Indonesia is least dependent and has less capabilities
for maritime security. Furthermore, Indonesia remains
protective of its national sovereignty and has opposed
any initiative perceived as a possible threat to its
sovereignty. The United States once attempted to
launch the Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI), which would involve the US Navy in mari-
time security operations in the Malacca Strait. The
RMSI was considered a part of the larger U.S.-led
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was
launched after 9/11 to increase U.S. involvement in
preventing maritime piracy and terrorism from jeopar-
dizing U.S. energy interests (Song, 2005). Under the
RMSI, the U.S. would be involved in joint intelli-
gence gathering, patrols, and be allowed to position
troops in the Malacca Strait (Vavro, 2008). The
proposal was met with harsh opposition from Malay-
sia and Indonesia, fearing intervention from the
United States and the internationalization of security
in the Malacca. Thus, security measures cannot
commence effectively (Acharya, 2007).
Indonesia’s interests in the Malacca Strait are
mostly in the area of maritime security. Since the
Strait is an important energy thoroughfare for Gulf
oil, as a littoral state, Indonesia – along with Malaysia
and Singapore – is responsible for ensuring safe
passage. Related to energy security, there are issues
such as piracy and illegal fishing that pose as non-
traditional security threats towards Indonesia. Addi-
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tionally, the vicinity of the Strait are still Indonesia’s
territorial waters, meaning that it is in Indonesia’s vital
interest to safeguard the Malacca Strait.
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
The third region is the Taiwan Strait, where oil
supplies from the Malacca Strait continue into China
and Taiwan. China is mostly interested in securing the
Taiwan Strait due to its dependence on oil supplies
from the Gulf. Statistics show that in 2012, China
imported a total of 271 million tonnes of crude oil,
20 percent of which were imported from Saudi
Arabia. On a global scale, China’s oil consumption
ranked second with a total 3,751 million barrels in
2012 (China Energy Group, 2014). The main issue in
the Taiwan Strait is mostly related to Taiwan-China
military tensions.
China and Taiwan are still locked in political
tensions with one another. Taiwan will continue to
stand for its sovereignty, while China will persist on
integrating Taiwan with the mainland. Taiwan is seeing
a more democratized government along with an
increasing sense of a “Taiwan identity”. In light of this,
along with increasing Chinese nationalist fervor,
China is developing a “military option” for a Taiwan
scenario. The military option is suspected to have
implications on security in the Taiwan Strait as a
response to a worst-case scenario involving an uncon-
trolled arms race between China and Taiwan. These
heightened political tensions have security implica-
tions on the Taiwan Strait (Saunders, 2005).
As a result of political tensions between China and
Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait is at risk of being a battle-
ground between the two countries. In 1996, US
warships stood off against the Chinese Navy. Known
as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the arrival of US warships
helped bolstered Taiwan’s defenses, but at the cost of
heightened tensions between China and Taiwan. To
further assert its power over Taiwan, China has
installed ballistic missiles along the Strait and has been
enhancing its amphibious warfare capabilities. Taiwan,
on the other hand, is still heavily reliant on the US
security umbrella. The Taiwan Ministry of National
Defense estimated that by 2020, China would be able
to launch a full-scale missile attack on Taiwan (The
Taipei Times, 2013).
Though Indonesia is situated far from the Taiwan
Strait, the problems in the Strait – should tensions
escalate – would have an impact on Indonesia’s
economic relations with China and Taiwan. China is
among one of the top investors in Indonesia, with a
total of USD 75.1 million invested in 200 projects
(The Jakarta Post, 2015a). Previously, Indonesia and
China have already been engaged in mutual trade in
2005 to 2013. During that period, bilateral trade and
investment reached USD 66 billion and USD 2
billion respectively (Parameswaran, 2015). Taiwan also
enjoys a beneficial economic relationship with Indone-
sia. In July 2011, bilateral trade reached USD 7.041
billion, while Taiwanese investment reached USD
14.046 billion (Antara News, 2012). Considering
these relations, an escalation of tensions in the Taiwan
Strait would cause significant losses to Indonesia’s
economy as bilateral trade declines.
THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEA
The fourth region includes the East and South
China Sea, where oil supplies depart from the Malacca
to the Philippines and Japan. Both seas are currently
in a state of conflict. In the South, China is aggres-
sively claiming territory, exacerbating tensions with
four ASEAN members; whereas in the East, China-
Japan tensions are constantly flared due to a territorial
dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands.
Both the East and South China Sea have been
claimed to store abundant amounts of hydrocarbon
fuels. In the South China Sea alone, it is estimated
that there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas; whereas in the East China
Sea, the EIA estimates reserves around 200 million
barrels of oil and around 2 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas, making the regions lucrative spots for
extraction (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2014).
China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN members (Viet-
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nam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines) are
involved in a prolonged territorial dispute over the
Spratly and Paracel islands. The conflict shows no
signs of abating and is becoming increasingly worrying
as China continues to assert its naval power in the
region. Tensions between ASEAN members have
increased in 2014. Anti-China protests have been
conducted in Vietnam as a response to China’s
assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, which
includes a clash between the navies of the two coun-
tries. The Philippines are seeking for help from the
United States to balance an aggressive China (National
Institute for Defense Studies, 2015). ASEAN has been
expected to resolve the dispute; however, ASEAN has
yet to draft a Code of Conduct to regulate behaviour
in the South China Sea and prevent further land
reclamation by China. Recent efforts to reach a
conclusion on the Code of Conduct have failed. In
November 2015, ASEAN defense ministers, including
from the U.S. and China, failed to agree on a joint
declaration to the South China Sea dispute. The
failure was attributed to China’s reluctance to have
clauses related to the South China Sea put in the final
joint declarations (Reuters, 2015a). The prolonged
dispute calls to question ASEAN’s dispute settlement
mechanisms and its role in regional security.
In the East China Sea, China and Japan are balanc-
ing one another militarily. Military tensions between
the two countries are fuelled by overlapping territorial
claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In 2013,
China established an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea, further exacerbating
tensions between the two countries. Later, in 2014,
Chinese fighter aircraft almost collided with Japanese
Self-Defense aircraft (National Institute for Defense
Studies, 2015).
In the South China Sea, there is an overlap in
interests between China and Indonesia that continue
to hinder the development of better bilateral relations.
Though not a claimant state, Indonesia still has
security concerns in the area. The prospect of the
South China Sea becoming a regional flashpoint has
caused Indonesia to increase its border defenses on the
island of Natuna, which is in close proximity with the
disputed waters. In September 2015, Indonesia’s
Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu, called for
increased defenses on the island which included a
port, an extension of its pre-existing military base, an
inspection of existing weapons systems, and acquiring
new weapons systems (The Jakarta Post, 2015b).
Moreover, Indonesia claimed that it would bring
China to an international tribunal if the issue cannot
be resolved through dialogue (Reuters, 2015b), a move
will likely set relations back. As Indonesia develops a
more assertive stance, it risks its bilateral relations with
China. Nelson and Sulaiman (2015) argues that
Indonesia’s stance “…could pave the way for a clash
with China…” and also attract other countries in the
Asia-Pacific that share similar concerns for China’s
ambitions such as Japan and the Philippines. However,
the inclusion of additional interests in the South
China Sea would only serve to muddle the issue
further. Hence, it would be wise for Indonesia to
continue bilateral engagement with China and main-
tain amicable relations, as Indonesia still requires
Chinese investment for advancing the global maritime
axis.
Map of Southeast China Sea. US Energy Information Administration. 2013. The South China Sea is
an important world energy trade route http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10671
THE SEA OF JAPAN
The last region is the Sea of Japan, where oil
supplies are received by Japan and then continued to
the United States through the Tsugaru Strait. Issues in
the Sea of Japan involve territorial disputes between
South Korea and Japan over the Takeshima/Dokdo
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islands, and also tensions between South Korea,
Japan, and an ambitious North Korea. As a country
highly dependent on imports, especially oil, the
SLOCs in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan are Japan’s
vital economic bloodlines. Maintaining SLOC security
around the Sea of Japan has long been the task of
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) along
with the U.S. Navy.
Bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan
have been cold due to the ongoing territorial dispute
over the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute. Since the early
2000s, the disputed islands have frequented political
agendas in both South Korea and Japan and have
caused strains to bilateral relations (Choi, 2005).
While both countries are attempting to normalize
relations, the dispute has a potential to become a
flashpoint in the Sea of Japan, as both Japan and
South Korea continue to modernize their military.
A larger threat looms over the Sea of Japan which
threatens both countries. North Korea has long been
considered a threat to the stability of East Asia. Since
2006, North Korea has conducted multiple nuclear
tests. In 2013, tensions between North Korea and
South Korea increased following a successful nuclear
test and the North’s declaration of war against the
South. The nuclear test also exacerbated tensions with
Japan. In 2014, North Korea showed no signs of
backing down as it declared a fourth nuclear test and
continued with missile launches near the Sea of Japan
(The Guardian, 2014).
While there are no immediate Indonesian interests
in this particular region, North Korea still poses a
large threat due to its unpredictable behaviour and
possession of WMD. Former Indonesian Foreign
Minister Marty Natalegawa (2013) noted a “trust-
deficit” in the Sea of Japan between North Korea and
its neighbours could cause the region to descend into
conflict as countries “… pursue guarantees of their
own security at the expense of the other and, indeed,
ultimately, to itself”. Conflict in the Sea of Japan
would surely jeopardize the cordial partnership with
Japan that Indonesia has fostered for a long time,
causing significant economic turbulences.
Reviewing the maritime security challenges in the
Indian Ocean shows that Indonesia holds major
interests in three of the five important SLOCs in the
Indian Ocean; the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait,
and the South China Sea. In the two remaining
SLOCs, Indonesia’s interests are not immediate, but
still need to be taken into account. Indonesia possess
vital interests in the Malacca Strait due to its proxim-
ity with Indonesian territory and the urgency of the
problems in the Strait, making the Malacca Strait one
of the most important SLOCs in Indonesia’s priority
list. Second is the South China Sea. Indonesia, along
with other members of ASEAN, are struggling to
conclude a peaceful resolution to end the conflict.
There is also a conflict of interests between Indonesia
and China regarding the issue of Natuna. Finally, in
the Indian Ocean, Indonesia looks forward to becom-
ing more involved in multilateralism and building a
regional architecture in the region.
THE GLOBAL MARITIME AXIS AND INDONESIA’S ROLE IN
SLOC SECURITY
Indonesia is and has been dependent on SLOCs in
the Indo-Pacific, especially the Malacca Strait and the
South China Sea. There are also minor SLOCs within
Indonesia’s territory, such as the Lombok and Sunda
Strait, which are often used as alternatives to the
Malacca Strait. SLOC security has gained a renewed
place in Indonesia’s political agenda, especially in Joko
Widodo’s proposed “global maritime axis” policy.
Joko Widodo’s foreign policy lies on branding
Indonesia as a “global maritime axis”. The policy
works on two fronts: the strategic and economic.
On the strategic front, the global maritime axis
envisions Indonesia as an Indo-Pacific maritime power
through the enhancement of maritime defense capa-
bilities. The plan is to increase defense expenditures by
1.5 percent over the next 5 years to procure the
necessary defense equipment and improve Indonesia’s
naval capabilities. Despite its size, Indonesia’s naval
capabilities are subpar to smaller countries in South-
east Asia. Plans on modernizing Indonesia’s fleet have
been around since the Yudhoyono era. In 2005,
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Yudhoyono approved the Minimum Essential Force, a
long-term plan to develop Indonesia’s overall military
power by 2024. The plan envisions five fleets, totaling
274 vessels, with sufficient patrolling and striking
capabilities (Shekar & Liow, 2014). Aside from budget
increases and military procurement, developing
Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry is also one of Joko
Widodo’s agenda. Joko Widodo aims for the ship-
building industry to be able to produce not only
military-grade equipment, but also vessels fit for
civilian use. The shipbuilding industry is an integral
part to the global maritime axis as it would allow
Indonesia to depend less on external parties for
supplying the much needed logistics required to
develop Indonesian maritime power. Despite its
importance, the shipbuilding sector remains underde-
veloped due to taxes and insufficient funding (Jakarta
Post, 2013). Given these conditions, a defense revolu-
tion, though expected, has yet to take place as reforms
are advancing at a slow pace.
On the economic front, the global maritime axis
seeks to capitalize on Indonesia’s geopolitical advan-
tage as an economic maritime trade hub by bolstering
port infrastructure and improving inter-island connec-
tivity. The objective is twofold. First, on a domestic
level, enhancing inter-island connectivity by improving
ports across the archipelago would provide the eco-
nomic boost the outer islands desperately need.
Mostly, economic development is concentrated in the
western islands (Java and Sumatera) while the Eastern
islands suffer from logistics problems, causing a wide
development gap and economic inequality. As a result,
these islands have often been alienated from national
economic activity and opt to become self-sufficient
economies. The most cited problem is lack of ad-
equate transportation facilities. Since land transport is
inefficient and ineffective, the best mode of supplying
the eastern islands is by sea. However, many port
facilities across Indonesia have fallen into disrepair due
to negligence and inadequate funding from the govern-
ment (Shekar & Liow, 2014). Thus, Joko Widodo
proposed a “sea highway” (tol laut), which takes form
of large carrier ships capable of mobilizing large
amounts of goods and people throughout the archi-
pelago, in an attempt to cut transportation costs and
connect the eastern islands to the economic centres of
Java. Second, on an international level, improving
port facilities would allow Indonesian ports to handle
more economic activity from domestic and interna-
tional shipping. Major ports in Indonesia, such as
Tanjung Priok, suffer from inadequate storage facilities
which cause long dwelling times for cargo. The World
Bank (2014) reported that in 2013, the average dwell-
ing time at Tanjung Priok reached 6.4 days. Longer
dwelling time inevitably leads to additional costs,
which increases prices of goods. Measures have been
taken to introduce a more efficient system based on
computerisation; however, it will require more time
for the system to be fully implemented.
In regard to SLOC security, Indonesia has shown
that it means serious business. Since Joko Widodo’s
inauguration, concentrated efforts have been made to
make the global maritime axis a reality. We stress three
important efforts: the “sink the vessels” policy, revital-
ization of the shipbuilding industry, and Indonesia’s
security relations with India. These efforts mark
significant progress in Indonesia’s approach to mari-
time security in the Indo-Pacific and the global mari-
time axis.
“SINK THE VESSELS”
Economic losses due to illegal fishing in Indonesian
waters have prompted Joko Widodo to start a “war
against illegal fishing”. The Indonesian government
began its “sink the vessels” policy, where illegal fishing
boats, were sunk. The most striking display of the
policy was Indonesia’s choice to sink an illegal Chi-
nese vessel detained in 2009 near the South China
Sea. On 20 May 2015, the Gui Xei Yu 12661 (a 3,000
gross tonnage vessel) was destroyed, along with 40
other detained ships from ASEAN countries, to
commemorate National Awakening Day. Minister Susi
Pudjiastuti denies the act as a “show of force” and
insists it an enforcement of Indonesian law (Jakarta
Post, 2015).
Indonesia’s extreme approach to illegal fishing
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raises questions on how Joko Widodo approaches
regional relations. It is unclear whether Joko Widodo
wants to pursue populism or regional cordiality. As
the deadline for the ASEAN Community draws near,
members of ASEAN are expected to ideally maintain
harmonious relations to proceed with regional eco-
nomic integration. Sinking vessels of fellow ASEAN
members is deviant to Indonesia’s benevolent regional-
ism since the Yudhoyono era and has caused uncer-
tainty among other ASEAN members, raising ques-
tions on Indonesia’s regional intentions. An editorial
in The Straits Times (2014) called for an “eloquent
point man to put the scope of Indonesia’s nationalism
in the proper perspective” and for Indonesia to
“ensure diplomatic relations in the region are safe-
guarded”. Beijing has also expressed concerns over the
destruction of the Chinese vessel. Hong Lei, spokes-
man for the foreign ministry, stated that China is
“gravely concerned” and asks for clarification of
Indonesia’s actions. Hong Lei further called for the
safeguarding of “legitimate rights and interests of
Chinese companies” (Channel News Asia, 2015).
Thayer (2014) also cautioned Joko Widodo from
sacrificing long-term relations with ASEAN in favour
of populist policies. While the act of sinking Chinese
ships shows consistency on enforcing its policy, it is
feared that the incident would only serve to heighten
tensions with China and jeopardize attempts to bring
order to the South China Sea.
Revitalizing the Shipbuilding Industry
Despite Indonesia being an archipelago, the ship-
building industry remains underdeveloped. There are
around 100 shipyards in Indonesia. A majority are
used for repairs and commerce, while only a few are
used for shipbuilding. The shipbuilding industry is
dominated by four major state-owned enterprises: PT
PAL, PT Dok dan Perkapalan Surabaya, PT Industri
Kapal Indonesia, and PT Dok dan Perkapalan Kodja
Bahari. Production is relatively small; only 100 vessels
per annum are produced (Lee, 2015).
Despite being an essential industry for the success
of the global maritime axis, the industry faces cumber-
some taxes and a severe lack of human resources.
In 2013, Indonesian shipbuilders struggled to meet
their production targets. Shipbuilding components
are mostly imported and are subject to additional
import tax, resulting in higher production costs and
ultimately, higher prices. A ship produced in an
Indonesian shipyard can cost up to thirty percent
more than a Chinese ship (Jakarta Globe, 2015). High
taxes have caused the industry to be concentrated in
Batam, where due to its status as a Free Trade Zone,
import taxes are not imposed.
According to Susilo Bambang Sulisto, Chairman of
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), the
shipbuilding industry requires more “professional
human resources” skilled in engineering, financing,
and law if Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry wants to
have the capacity to meet global demand (Antara
News, 2015). In 2013, Indonesia and South Korea
signed a technology transfer agreement between PT
PAL and Daewoo. However, according to M.
Firmansyah Arifin, Chief Director of PT PAL, the
technology transfer would not fully benefit Indonesia.
Based on the terms of the agreement, the Indonesian
experts sent to South Korea were only limited to
observing submarine blueprints and were not given a
hands-on experience in the production of submarines
(Tempo, 2013). Indonesia still lacks the expertise
needed to engineer new blueprints and adopt foreign
technologies into the domestic shipbuilding industry.
To address the issue, Joko Widodo, in line with
the global maritime axis, has devised a five-year plan to
revitalize the shipbuilding industry. Three fiscal
incentives were provided i.e. a revision of tax laws to
abolish value-added tax on shipbuilding facilities,
subsidization of import tariffs, and tax allowances on
income tax. Rent waivers are also included for state-
owned enterprises as a non-fiscal incentive
(Kementerian BUMN, 2014). As for the issue of
human resources, a large amount of investment in
research and development is required before
Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry can get on its feet.
RELATIONS WITH INDIA
Joko Widodo envisions Indonesia as an Indo-
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Pacific maritime power, capable of safeguarding not
only Indonesian waters, but also SLOCs in the Indian
Ocean and Pacific. To a large extent, Indonesia would
have to consider the existence of India as an emerging
power in the Indian Ocean region. At the 2014 India-
ASEAN Summit, Narendra Modi announced an
upgraded version of Narasimha Rao’s “Look East”
policy, called “Act East”. The policy indicates India’s
intentions to be more involved in Southeast Asia to
balance a rising China. Furthermore, Indonesia would
also have to engage bilaterally with China, especially
considering China’s influence in the Indian Ocean
through its ‘string of pearls’.
India and Indonesia, aside from sharing a long
history together, have shared security interests, espe-
cially related with SLOC security in the Indian Ocean
region. In 2001, India and Indonesia signed a defence
cooperation agreement, which was later renewed and
expanded in 2013. The agreement covered outer
space, nuclear energy, food security, counterterrorism,
defence, maritime security, and trans-border security
(The Hindu, 2013). India has also given Indonesia a
special seat in their high-level annual summits. Such
positions were only provided for Japan and Russia,
marking Indonesia’s significance in Indian foreign
relations. In SLOC security, India and Indonesia have
started maritime security cooperation since 2006. In
2006, India offered to help Indonesia in dealing with
piracy in the Malacca Strait by providing naval assis-
tance (Valencia, 2007). Furthermore, India has
stepped up its involvement in SLOC security in the
Malacca Strait through its naval bases in the Andaman
and Nicobar islands. Established in 2001, the
Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) has become
important location for India’s “look east” policy and
to secure the Malacca Strait. In the recent years, the
ANC has become an important strategic asset for
India, serving not only to secure SLOCs, but as a focal
point for India’s military diplomacy with ASEAN and
also to balance the rise of China. India has been
upgrading the ANC with fighter jets, helicopters, and
transport planes, which would allow India to exercise
amphibious tactics in Southeast Asia (The New Indian
Express, 2014).
A mutual convergence of interests between Indone-
sia and India is imminent. As Indonesia “looks west”
to become more involved in the Indian Ocean,
Indonesia would have to engage with India. Likewise,
if India wishes to continue its engagement in South-
east Asia, it would have to consider Indonesia’s
presence. The convergence is visible not just on a
bilateral level, but also the multilateral level. During
India’s term as chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Associa-
tion (IORA), maritime security and safety was added
as one of six priorities to the IORA agenda. This
agenda nicely fits Joko Widodo’s regional interests in
the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Indonesia is set to chair
the IORA in 2015. Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s
foreign minister has insisted that Indonesia will focus
on contributing, within its capabilities, to the organi-
zation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Through
the IORA, it is expected that the global maritime axis
concept will be able to fit into larger and more
comprehensive regional maritime security architecture.
Currently, the IORA lacks developed regional security
architecture (Agastia & Perwita, 2015). No single
“great power” is available in the IORA; only “middle
powers”. In the face of an assertive China, strategic
cooperation between Indonesia and India is likely as
Indonesia seeks equilibrium in the region, while India
seeks to balance China. By chairing IORA, Indonesia
would have the clout to engage in diplomacy with
other smaller powers in the region and push for the
development of a security architecture that can address
the emerging security issues in the region. Addition-
ally, the IORA has the potential to balance China’s
“string of pearls” in the region.
CONCLUSION
Under Joko Widodo, Indonesia has started its first
step to becoming a maritime power in the Indo-Pacific
as SLOC security becomes an increasingly vital agenda
for great powers and developing economies in the
region. Indonesia has made it clear that it will no
longer tolerate infringement of its territorial waters
and has begun to modernize its navy to ensure it has
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the capabilities required to secure SLOCs in the Indo-
Pacific. Additionally, Indonesia has started to build
multilateral initiatives to achieve its goal. All in all,
SLOC security has definitely become a top priority for
the Joko Widodo administration.
Additional challenges, however, await Indonesia. In
commencing its “sink the vessels” policy, Indonesia
would to best not to jeopardize relations with
neighbours and China, especially given the hostile
situation in the South China Sea. As for revitalizing
the shipbuilding industry, Indonesia still requires
adequate human resources to develop ships before
achieving self-sufficiency. On the multilateral level,
Indonesia still has ways to go before integrating the
global maritime axis into regional security architec-
ture.
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